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Abstract
Consumers often get unnecessarily mired in trivial decisions. Four studies support a metacognitive
account for this painful phenomenon. Our central premise is that people use subjective experiences of
difficulty while making a decision as a cue to how much further time and effort to spend. People generally
associate important decisions with difficulty. Consequently, if a decision feels unexpectedly difficult, due
to even incidental reasons, people may draw the reverse inference that it is also important, and
consequently increase the amount of time and effort they expend. Ironically, this process is particularly
likely for decisions that initially seemed unimportant because people expect them to be easier (whereas
important decisions are expected to be difficult to begin with). Our studies not only demonstrate that
unexpected difficulty causes people to get caught-up in unimportant decisions, but also to voluntarily
seek more options, which can increase decision difficulty even further.
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ABSTRACT

People often get unnecessarily mired in trivial decisions. The current research proposes a
metacognitive account for this painful phenomenon. Our central premise is that people use
subjective experiences of difficulty while making a decision as a cue to how much further time
and effort to spend. People generally associate important decisions with difficulty. Consequently,
if a decision feels unexpectedly difficult, due to even incidental reasons, people may draw the
reverse inference that it is also important, and consequently increase the amount of time and
effort they expend. Ironically, this process is particularly likely for decisions that initially seemed
unimportant because people expect them to be easier. In contrast, the real-time experience of
difficulty tends to be less diagnostic for important decisions, which are expected to be more
difficult and laborious to begin with.
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People often find themselves mired in seemingly trivial decisions. We agonize over what
toothbrush to buy, struggle with what flight to purchase, and labor over which shade of white to
paint the kitchen. While much research (and common wisdom) suggest that people should
deliberate harder the more important the decision (Chaiken & Maheswaran 1994; Petty &
Wegener 1998), why do people sometimes get stuck in seemingly minor choices?
We suggest that metacognitive inference contributes to a process we name “decision
quicksand,” whereby people get sucked into spending more time on unimportant decisions.
Research on metacognition shows that people often use the subjective difficulty with which
information is processed as an input to other, even seemingly unrelated, judgments (Schwarz
2004). For example, stimuli that are harder to process are often seen as more distant (Alter &
Oppenheimer 2008), instrumental (Labroo & Kim 2009), and unique (Pocheptsova, Labroo, &
Dhar 2010) than their easy-to-process equivalents.
Our central premise is that people use the subjective difficulty experienced while making
a decision as a cue to how much further time and effort to spend. More important decisions are
often more difficult because they involve higher stakes that call for laborious scrutiny. As a
result, people tend to expect decisions regarding significant matters to be difficult and decisions
regarding trivial matters to be easy. Indeed, when asked 80 respondents, 91% indicated that
important decisions should generally be more difficult than unimportant ones. Consequently, if a
decision feels unexpectedly difficult, we propose that people may draw the reverse inference that
it is also important and deserving of more attention.
But while subjective difficulty sometimes reflects genuine importance, it can also be
generated by incidental factors such as too many options (Iyengar & Lepper 2000), conflicting
tradeoffs (Tversky & Shafir 1992), or processing disfluency (Schwarz 2004). These factors often
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have little to do with decision importance, but may nevertheless increase subjective difficulty.
We argue that they can make decisions seem more important which, in turn, should increase the
amount of time people spend choosing (Chaiken & Maheswaran 1994; Petty & Wegener 1998).
Ironically, we argue that this process is particularly likely for decisions that initially
seemed unimportant because people expect them to be easier. The influence of experiential
information (e.g., cognitive difficulty) on judgment is stronger the more the experience deviates
from expectations (Wänke, Schwarz, & Bless 1995; Whittlesea & Williams 2000). In other
words, it is not metacognitive difficulty by itself, but rather unexpected difficulty that informs
judgment (e.g., “I thought this should be easy, but it’s not”). Even moderate metacognitive
experiences can have a stronger impact on judgment than extreme ones when the former are
more unexpected than the latter (Schwarz 2004; Whittlesea & Williams 1998). Since decisions
on important matters are expected to be tough, real-time experiences of difficulty provide little
added information. For less important issues, however, subjective decision difficulty is more
likely to be unexpected and therefore more likely to serve as a metacognitive cue for how
important it is to get the decision right. Though it may not change how people see the issue as a
whole, making a good decision in that particular instance may come to be seen as more
important. Thus, while difficulty can mechanically cause decisions to take longer, we propose it
can have an additional detriment. Especially for decisions that originally seemed unimportant,
metacognitive inference from difficulty can lead people to spend even longer deciding.
Three experiments test the prediction that misattributing difficulty to decision importance
can lead people to get sucked into unimportant decisions. Experiment 1 uses a field setting with
real monetary consequences to examine whether difficulty resulting from tradeoff conflict
(Chatterjee & Heath 1996) leads people to spend more time deciding on unimportant matters
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(and whether this effect is more pronounced than for important matters). Experiment 2
manipulates difficulty through perceptual disfluency (Reber & Schwarz 1999), and tests our
proposed metacognitive account by examining whether the effect of difficulty on deliberation
time is mediated by perceived decision importance and disappears when people attribute
difficulty to an alternative source (Labroo & Kim 2009; Novemsky et al. 2007). Finally,
experiment 3 examines the spiraling nature of decision quicksand, testing whether struggling
longer over an unimportant issue leads people to invest even further time deciding.

EXPERIMENT 1: REAL ASSIGNMENT CHOICES

Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is an online labor market where people post assignments for
“workers” to choose from. This makes it a particularly strong domain to test our hypothesis
because it is incentive-compatible and workers are motivated to spend as little time as possible
given a certain payment (Mason & Suri 2010). We presented workers with a real choice and
observed the effect of decision importance and difficulty on the time they spent choosing.

Method

One hundred twenty one Mechanical Turkers (mean age = 32; 49% female) chose an
assignment for later completion. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions
in a 2 (Importance: high vs. low) x 2 (Difficulty: high vs. low) between-subject design.
We varied decision importance using a manipulation validated in prior research (Schrift,
Netzer, & Kivetz 2010). Half the participants (high-importance condition) were told that their
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choice was binding and that they would not be able to switch once their choice was submitted.
The other half (low-importance condition) were told that their choice was not binding and that
they could switch whenever they wanted.
Decision difficulty was manipulated through the number of options and tradeoffs, Figure
1. Participants in the difficult condition selected among four assignments which varied on four
dimensions. These options included multiple tradeoffs among attributes and no single option
dominated the others. Participants in the easy condition selected among only two options, one of
which nearly dominated the other (superior on three attributes and inferior on one)1. Our key
dependent variable was the amount of time participants spent, in seconds, before submitting their
decision.

Results and Discussion

Analysis of variance on time revealed a main effect of difficulty, F(1, 117) = 25.31, p <
.001, η2 = .178, qualified by the predicted importance x difficulty interaction, F(1, 117) = 4.12, p
< .05, η2 = .034, Figure 2. While difficulty increased time spent in general, it had a particularly
pronounced effect in the unimportant condition (Measy = 20.2 vs. Mdifficult = 47.8), F(1, 117) =
25.36, p < .001, η2 = .318, compared to the important condition (Measy = 28.8 vs. Mdifficult = 40.5),
F(1, 117) = 4.43, p < .05, η2 = .066.
Experiment 1 provides preliminary support of our prediction that experiences of
difficulty can lead people to get stuck in unimportant decisions. Increased decision difficulty led
people to spend more time deciding, but this effect was particularly pronounced when the

1

Confirming the decision difficulty manipulation, all participants in the easy condition selected the superior option,
whereas choice was distributed across all four options in the difficult condition.
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decision initially seemed unimportant. The next experiment investigates whether metacognition
underlies this finding and tests the mediating role of perceived decision importance.

EXPERIMENT 2: THE PROCESS UNDERLYING DECISION QUICKSAND

Experiment 2 extends experiment 1 in three important ways. First, rather than
manipulating difficulty through the options themselves, we kept the options and tradeoffs
difficulty the same but manipulated ease of processing by presenting them in an easy or difficult
to read font (Labroo & Kim 2009). This provides an even stronger test of our theory because it
allows us to examine whether inferences about decision difficulty lead people to spend more
time on unimportant decisions even when difficulty is truly exogenous to the decision. Second,
we collected measures of perceived decision importance to examine its hypothesized mediating
role in these effects. Finally, we examined the role of misattribution by adding a condition in
which participants were prompted to correctly attribute difficulty to font quality (adapted from
Novemsky et al., 2007). If the effect of difficulty on deliberation time is driven by misattribution
of the experience to decision importance, as we suggest, then calling attention to the true source
of difficulty should eliminate the effect.

Method

Participants (N = 264, mean age = 38; 70% female) were recruited through a nationwide
database of people who indicated they were interested in completing psychological experiments
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on the Internet. They were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (Importance: high vs. low) x 3
(Difficulty: low vs. high vs. high with corrected attribution) between-subject design.
They chose between two flight options described using four attributes, and decision
importance was manipulated through framing. In the important [unimportant] condition, people
were asked to imagine they were traveling for an important [unimportant] meeting and the
journey was said to be “relatively long and tiring, so it is very important that you get the best
flight possible [short and easy, so it is relatively unimportant what flight you get].”
Decision difficulty was manipulated through processing ease. The two options were
presented using either a small, low-contrast font (high-difficulty condition) or a larger, highcontrast font (low-difficulty condition), (Labroo & Kim 2009). The content of the options and
tradeoffs was kept the same across difficulty conditions. In the corrected attribution condition,
the options were presented in hard-to-read font but participants were forewarned that the
information might be difficult to read because of low font quality.
Our key dependent variable was how much time participants spent deciding. To test the
mediating role of perceived decision importance of making a good decision, participants also
rated the extent to which it was important to them to make a good decision and the decision
seemed important (1 = Not at all important; 7 = Very important, r = .76, averaged to form an
index). Finally, as a manipulation check, participants rated how the decision compared to
expectations (1 = easier than expected; 4 = neither easier nor harder than expected; 7 = harder
than expected).
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Results

Manipulation check. As expected, an importance x difficulty ANOVA on perceived
difficulty relative to expectations revealed a significant interaction F(1, 258) = 3.19, p < .05. Ttests indicated that experienced difficulty was significantly higher than expected (as represented
by the neutral midpoint of the scale, 4) only in the low-importance, disfluent condition (M =
4.69), t = 4.93, p < .01. Experienced difficulty was no different from expectations (as measured
by the neutral midpoint of the scale) in all the other conditions (all t < 1, ns), and these
conditions did not differ significantly from one another, all F(1, 258) < 1.7, ns.
Effect on deliberation time. A 2 (importance) x 3 (difficulty) ANOVA on time revealed a
main effect of difficulty, F(2, 258) = 4.17, p < .05, η2 = .038, which was qualified by the
predicted interaction, F(2, 258) = 3.80, p < .05, η2 = .035. See figure 3.
As expected, when the decision seemed unimportant, decision difficulty increased
deliberation time (Mfluent = 35.9 vs. Mdisfluent = 51.3), F(2, 258) = 7.92, p < .001, η2 = .232, but it
did not have the same effect when the decision seemed important (Mfluent = 45.2 vs. Mdisfluent =
45.0), F < .20, ns. Looked at another way, when the options were easy to process, people
deliberated longer in the important condition, F(1, 258) = 6.35, p < .05, but this reversed when
the options were harder to process, F(1, 258) = 3.57, p < .06.
Moreover, the corrected attribution condition reveals that the effect of increased difficulty
on unimportant decisions disappeared when participants had been prompted to correctly attribute
difficulty to the font (Mdisfluent_corrected = 37.5, significantly smaller than Mdisfluent = 51.3, p < .005,
but similar to Mfluent = 35.9, p = .49). This supports the notion that the effect of difficulty was
driven by misattribution of difficulty to decision importance.
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Effect on perceived importance of making a good decision. Running the same ANOVA
on perceived decision importance revealed a main effect of importance framing, F(1, 258) =
26.47, p < .001, η2 = .099, indicating that our manipulation was successful. Second, in addition
to a main effect of difficulty, F(2, 258) = 5.82, p < .05, the analysis also revealed the predicted
framing x difficulty interaction, F(2, 258) = 9.28, p < .001. As expected, decision difficulty
increased perceived decision importance in the low-importance condition, F(2, 258) < 14.81, p <
.001, but this effect was attenuated when the decision had been framed as important F < .30, ns.
Specifically, in the low-importance condition, participants perceived the decision as more
important when the options were disfluent (Mfluent = 3.6 vs. Mdisfluent = 5.1), p < .001, but this
difference disappeared when participants had been forewarned that font quality might make the
information difficult to read (Mdisfluent_attribution = 4.1, similar to Mfluent = 3.6, p < .2, but different
from Mdisfluent = 5.1 p < .06).
Moderated mediation analysis. We tested whether fluency impacted time through
perceived importance, where the path from fluency to perceived importance is moderated by
framing. Moderated mediation analysis was based on the approach and SPSS macro developed
by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007). The results indicated that perceived importance was
predicted by the fluency x framing interaction in the mediator model, t = 4.39, p < .001. In the
dependent-variable model, perceived importance predicted time, t = 3.72, p < .001, whereas the
fluency x framing interaction did not, t = 1.22, ns. The conditional indirect effect of fluency on
time through perceived importance was significant in the low-importance framing condition, z =
2.45, p < .05, but not in the high-importance framing condition, z = .61, ns. This suggests that the
effect of difficulty on decision time was mediated by increased perceived decision importance,
but only in the low-importance condition.
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Discussion

These results extend the findings of Experiment 1 to a situation where difficulty is
entirely exogenous to the decision and provide deeper insight into the mechanism behind the
effect. Increased difficulty led people to spend more time deciding because it increased the
perceived importance of making a good decision, but only when the decision originally seemed
unimportant (i.e., difficulty was unexpected). Consistent with our metacognitive explanation, the
effect disappeared when difficulty was attributed to its true source (the font).
Importantly, our findings are inconsistent with a number of alternative accounts. First, a
ceiling-effect explanation for the lack of change in deliberation time in the high-importance
condition is inconsistent with the results of both experiment 1 and 2 because the amount of time
participants spent in those conditions was clearly exceeded in the low-importance/difficult
condition. Second, while metacognitive difficulty can lead to uncertainty and increased
systematic processing (Alter et al., 2007), this cannot explain why the effect of difficulty was
mediated by decision importance (experiment 2). Casting further doubt on this explanation, we
asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt certain about their decision and confident
while making it (on 7-point scales), using a similar set-up to experiment 2. Neither the fluency
manipulation, nor the interaction between fluency and importance, impacted either certainty or
confidence ratings, all Fs < 1.2. That said, though both alternative accounts cannot explain our
results, these processes may contribute to “decision quicksand” in some instances.
The experiments so far have focused on direct effects of metacognitive inference on
deliberation time, but metacognitive inferences regarding decision importance may also have
other downstream consequences. In particular, we labeled this phenomenon decision quicksand
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not only because it leads people to get stuck in unimportant decisions, but because, like
quicksand, exerting effort to get out may lead people to get stuck even further, in several ways.
For example, increased perceptions of decision importance due to incidental difficulty
could lead people to seek additional options (Kahn & Ratner 2005), further increasing
deliberation time and difficulty (Iyengar & Lepper 2000; Jacoby et al. 1974). Indeed, another
study we conducted found that metacognitive difficulty in unimportant decisions leads people to
search for more choice options. Using the same paradigm as in Experiment 2, we asked
participants (N = 183, mean age = 39; 68% female) how interested they were in seeing more
options before they made their decision (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much). Results revealed a
similar importance framing x fluency interaction, F(1, 179) = 4.06, p < .05, whereby processing
difficulty increased participants’ tendency to request more options when the decision was framed
as unimportant, F(1, 179) = 8.29, p < .005, but not when the decision was framed as important,
F < .01 , ns. Considering more options should not only directly increase deliberation time, but
can also make the decision more difficult which could, in turn, increase perceived importance
and further suck people in.

EXPERIMENT 3: PERCEPTIONS OF TIME SPENT EXACERBATE DECISION
QUICKSAND
The results so far have demonstrated that metacognitive inferences about decision
importance can lead people to spend more time on unimportant decisions. But if people form
inferences about decision importance from their own decision efforts, then not only might
increased perceived importance lead people to spend more time deciding, but increased decision
time might, in turn, validate and amplify these perceptions of importance, which might further
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increase deliberation time. Thus, one could imagine a recursive loop between deliberation time,
difficulty, and perceived importance. Inferences from difficulty may not only impact immediate
deliberation, but may kick off a quicksand cycle that leads people to spend more and more time
on a decision that initially seemed rather unimportant. Quicksand sucks people in, but the worse
it seems the more people struggle.
In experiment 3, we test the prediction that the more people feel they have been
struggling with an unimportant decision, the more likely they are to spend additional time. We
manipulate perceived elapsed time and examine the resulting consequences on further
deliberation.

Method

Students (N = 261; mean age = 22; 45% females) were randomly assigned to condition in
a 2 (Importance: high vs. low) x 2 (Difficulty: high vs. low) x 2 (Elapsed Time: normal vs. fast)
between-subject design. They imagined selecting a university course for the following semester
and chose between two options, each described using four attributes.
Decision importance was manipulated through framing. In the high [low] importance
condition, participants were told “both options [neither option] would count toward your major,
so it is an important [unimportant] decision.” Decision difficulty was manipulated through
processing ease (fluency), as in experiment 2.
We also manipulated how much time participants thought had elapsed by displaying a
running clock alongside the choice options (cf. Wearden, Pilpott, & Win 1999). In the normal
condition, the clock’s second hand completed a full circle every 60 seconds. In the fast condition,
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the hand was sped up (completed a circle every 15 seconds). Pretest results indicated that the
presence of the faster (vs. normal) clock increased perceptions of elapsed time.2
The focal dependent variable was the amount of time it took participants to make their
choice.

Results and Discussion

A 2 (importance) x 2 (difficulty) x 2 (clock) ANOVA on time replicated the importance x
difficulty interaction found in our prior studies, F(1, 253) = 35.38, p < .001, η2 = .131. Further,
this effect was qualified by a 3-way importance x difficulty x perceived time interaction, F(1,
253) = 4.37, p < .05, η2 = .023.
Looking at the low-importance condition shows that decision difficulty increased
decision time in the normal time condition (Measy = 28.9 vs. Mdifficult = 46.8), F(1, 131) = 11.8, p
< .005, but had an even stronger effect in the fast time condition (Measy = 28.0 vs. Mdifficult =
74.9), F(1, 131) = 48.3, p < .001, resulting in a significant difficulty x perceived time interaction,
F(1, 131) = 15.2, p < .001. Thus, people spent even more time on the unimportant decision when
they felt that more time had elapsed. There was no corresponding difficulty x perceived time
interaction in the high-importance decision condition, F < .9, ns. Figure 4.
An importance x perceived time interaction, F(1, 253) = 3.16, p < .08, suggested that
although people spent more time in general when time seemed to elapse faster, F(1, 253) = 5.50,
p < .05, this effect was significant in the low-importance condition (Mnormal = 37.8 vs. Mfast =

2

Participants (N = 50) were given 60 seconds to read some text. Those in the faster clock condition estimated they
spent longer reading (M = 87.7 seconds) than those in the normal condition (M = 73.4), F(1, 48) = 6.03, p < .05.

15
51.43), F(1, 253) = 8.65, p < .005, but disappeared in the high-importance condition (Mnormal =
49.4 vs. Mfast = 51.3), F < .3, ns.
These results indicate that perceptions of time spent deciding further contribute to the
tendency to get stuck in unimportant decisions. Though thinking one has spent more time could
potentially suggest that one has deliberated sufficiently already, decreasing further deliberation,
our results reveal an opposite pattern. Feeling like one has spent more time on an unimportant
decision leads people to invest even more time, causing them to get mired even further.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Our findings illustrate one reason that people get mired in unimportant decisions. Though
they may not be as consequential, unimportant decisions are just as often plagued by incidental
factors that make them difficult (e.g., trade-offs, disfluency, or information overload).
Metacognitive inference can make unexpectedly difficult decisions seem more important which,
in turn, increases deliberation time. Ironically, this process is more likely to occur for
unimportant decisions because people expect them to be easier. Although people may recognize
that they are dwelling on a trivial issue, they nevertheless feel during the decision experience that
it is important to get the decision right.
The results also illustrate the strength of this effect by demonstrating that unexpected
metacognitive difficulty can sometimes lead people to spend as much (experiment 1 and 3) or
even more time (experiment 2 and 3) on unimportant decisions as on important ones. Though
most people do not spend as much time choosing a toothbrush (less important decision) as a
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house (more important decision), these effects suggest that metacognitive inferences can
sometimes lead unimportant decisions to take longer than more important ones.
One thing that makes this phenomenon particularly intriguing is the discrepancy between
how people generally feel about relatively unimportant decisions and how they feel when the
decision is taking place. In the heat of the moment, experienced difficulty can impact how
important decision makers feel it is to get the decision right, leading them to get bogged down in
unimportant decisions. But once the dust has settled and choice has been made, people may
wonder why they spent so long deciding on a relatively inconsequential issue. Consequently,
low-level, concrete processing (Trope & Liberman 2010) should increase the likelihood that
people get stuck in unimportant decisions because people are more likely to be affected by
incidental metacognitive inputs under such processing (Tsai & Thomas 2011).
We have argued that experienced difficulty should have a stronger effect on lessimportant decisions, but whether it also impacts important decisions should depend, in part, on
expectations. In experiment 2, for example, participants did not find the important condition
harder than expected, even when it was difficult, and difficulty did not increase time they spent
on that decision. But if the difficulty experienced in an important decision is greater than
expected, it might also increase decision time. Interestingly, unexpected ease may not necessarily
decrease deliberation effort for important decisions because people are motivated to expend high
effort on important decisions even when they are easy (Schrift et al. 2010).
Overall, the current research demonstrates another reason choice can become difficult.
While choice is generally thought to be desirable (Botti & Iyengar 2004), recent work has shown
that it can often be paralyzing and fraught with regret due to factors such as too many options or
information (Iyengar & Lepper 2000; Schwartz 2004). But while these external factors can
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directly increase the time and effort needed to choose by increasing the amount of information to
process, our work shows that they can also have indirect effects through metacognitive inference.
By making decisions seem subjectively more important, these factors can further aggravate the
negative consequences of choice overload.
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Figure 1: Job Options (Experiment 1)
Assignment Options, Difficult Decision

Duration

Option 1

Option 2

Option 3

Option 4

25 minutes

15 minutes

15 minutes

5 minutes

$3 per hour
Tedious and
dull
Fixed time
slots

$1.50 per hour
Fun and
interesting
Whenever you
want

$6 per hour
Tedious and
dull
Fixed time
slots

$3 per hour
Fun and
Task type
interesting
Whenever you
Time flexibility
want
Hourly Rate

Assignment Options, Easy Decision
Option 1

Option 2

Duration

5 minutes

15 minutes

Hourly Rate

$3 per hour

$1.50 per hour

Task type

Fun and interesting

Tedious and dull

Time flexibility

Whenever you want

Fixed time slots

22
Figure 2: The Effect of Choice Difficulty and
Importance Framing on Deliberation Time (Experiment 1)
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Figure 3: The Effect of Disfluency and Importance Framing
on Deliberation Time (Experiment 2)
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Figure 4: The Effect of Perceived Elapsed Time (Experiment 3)
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